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Abstract 
Nigeria, like most countries around the world, has turned to Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to finance its 
infrastructure deficit. However, it appears that the government of Nigeria looks towards PPPs as the major solution to 
the country’s infrastructure crisis. In a sense PPPs are being sold to the public as if they were free, that the private sector 
would come in with its funds, provide the desired services and that the problem with the country’s infrastructure would 
automatically cease. This paper argues that this supposition is a myth and that the role of PPPs in the provision of public 
infrastructure is more nuanced than is being bandied around. PPPs are not the panacea to all of the country’s 
infrastructure problems and also are far from being completely free. It is however the case that if appropriately deployed, 
in most cases PPPs provide some advantages over conventional public sector procurements. This paper explores the 
different advantages and disadvantages of PPPs and suggests ways in which PPPs may be effectively used to improve 
the country’s infrastructure with reduced fiscal exposure to government.   
Keywords: public-private partnerships, infrastructure, Nigeria, private finance initiative 
1. Introduction 
The state of Nigeria’s infrastructure is abysmal. According to the National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan, it is 
estimated that 70% of the federal road network are not in good condition, 78% of state roads are in poor condition and 
87% of local roads are also in poor condition (National Planning Commission, 2014). Nigeria’s power sector is also 
poor with power generation mostly below 5000MW (National Planning Commission, 2014). The National Integrated 
Infrastructure Master Plan states that Nigeria’s current infrastructure stock ranges between 20% to 25% of GDP; this is 
way below the international benchmark of about 70% (National Planning Commission, 2014).   The major reason 
adduced for this state of affairs is the paucity of public funds. For instance, the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission (ICRC) estimates that the country requires about USD 100 billion in the next six years to enable the 
country bridge its infrastructure gap (Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission, 2018).  However, the 
Nigerian government has not been able to come up with the right amount of investment required to provide acceptable 
levels of infrastructure. This has led to the clamour for the use of private sector investments especially through PPPs to 
help bridge the gap.  
The idea that PPPs may be deployed for financing infrastructure is not new. There is a growing trend across the world 
where PPP and other similar structures have been successfully deployed to augment government budgets to provide 
infrastructure across several countries. However, PPPs have never been a silver bullet for resolving all the issues 
relating to the provision of infrastructure. This is because amongst other things, PPPs can be very expensive when 
deployed under certain conditions and are sometimes not suitable for use in the provision of certain social services or 
even in some infrastructure sectors. It however appears that these apparent limitations to the use of PPPs are lost on the 
policy makers within Nigeria. The general narrative around PPPs in Nigeria appears to be that PPPs can resolve most, if 
not all of the infrastructure challenges confronting the country and that private sector actors are in a position to develop 
infrastructure at little or no cost to government. This is evidenced from the different policy speeches by government 
officials (Abuja Inquirer, 2018) and spinets of this can be found in official economic policy documents like the 
Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) (Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2017), National 
Infrastructure Master Plan (National Planning Commission, 2014) and the National PPP Policy (Infrastructure 
Concession Regulatory Commission, 2009).  document, to mention a few. However, the most obvious evidence is from 
the manner in which PPP projects are being procured and delivered across the country. An example of this is the 
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propensity of the public sector to seek to transfer all the project risks to the private sector party regardless of whether it 
is ideal, extract maximum concession fees from the private sector parties, sometimes at the detriment of the project and 
neglecting to meet their contractual obligations to private sector investors. These are all actions that show clearly that 
the mindset of the government is that the private sector investors should bear the entire burden for developing PPP 
projects. 
It appears that there are two major policy thrusts for the use of PPPs for infrastructure. The first is the simple financial 
argument. This policy thread is the narrative that due to limited finances, governments require private sector 
investments to make up the financing gap required to fund infrastructural deficits. The problem with this argument is 
that it is not only limited in scope but can also be misleading. As has been argued above, PPPs are not free as 
governments pays for the services delivered through PPPs one way or the other. These are either through availability 
payments or through user fees made by the user public. Where citizens pay tolls or user fees to private sector service 
providers, governments effectively forgo the right to collect these fees as taxes, tying it instead to the payment for 
particular services provided by the private sector partners. Also, where PPPs are solely used as a means to finance 
infrastructure, it blunts out other potential benefits that can be garnered from PPPs. Therefore, governments that focus 
their PPP policies solely on the financial benefits to be derived from PPPs lose sight of more important benefits that 
may be derived from employing PPPs, usually leading to unsuccessful PPP programmes.  
The second policy thread is the use of PPPs as a management tool. When PPPs are used in this manner, it is to the effect 
that PPPs promote an efficient and competitive procurement regime, which ensures that only the best partners are given 
the opportunity to develop and operate infrastructure. The rigorous analysis and market testing which PPPs undergo 
ensures reduced whole life cycle costing and promotes value for money. It also ensures that the private sector parties are 
allocated risks and responsibilities that ensure that they deploy their superior expertise in delivering projects that add 
value to the end user public and save government money.  
The problem is that this very important management policy reason for the use of PPPs is hardly ever emphasized in 
Nigeria, with attention only paid to the use of PPPs as a tool for raising finance for infrastructure. This paper argues that 
this approach affects the public perception of the concept and might lead to the Nigerian government not even achieving 
its desired goal of bridging the infrastructure gap through PPP financing. Both policy approaches are not mutually 
exclusive but rather complementary. This is because at the core of the efficiency argument is the view that if PPPs are 
done properly, it leads to less expensive, more efficient and better-operated infrastructure.  Therefore, it is only when 
the two policy threads are effectively combined that the rich benefits of PPPs are enjoyed. It also ensures that the user 
public buy into the PPP programmes as their expectations are better managed and they are armed with a comprehensive 
verifiable set of objectives with which they can holistically evaluate projects. 
2. What Are PPPs?  
Prior to the explosion in the use of PPPs, public infrastructure like highways, bridges, railways, power plants and 
prisons where mostly financed, constructed, operated and maintained by government through its different public 
agencies. Typically, government would through a public procurement process award the contract for the construction of 
the infrastructure to a private sector entity and pay such private sector contractor through budgetary allocations. The 
operation and periodic maintenance of the publicly procured assets were then subsequently financed and done directly 
by government through the budget. What PPP as a method of procurement has done is that it has bundled a combination 
or all of the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of public infrastructure into a single long term contract 
between a public agency and the private sector party. During the lifespan of the contract, the private sector party 
receives a stream of revenues as compensation for its investment in the infrastructure. This compensation would 
typically cover the initial capital cost of the project, the operational expenses, the maintenance cost and an agreed return 
on the investment. These revenues may come directly as user fees from the user public or in the form of periodically 
made availability payments from the government or even a combination of both. Typically, the assets revert back to the 
government at the end of the contract. 
Like most terms of its ilk, there is no consensus on the definition of a PPP, there are indeed variations in the way in 
which the concept has been defined. The multitude of definitions of the concept in existence is influenced primarily by 
the fact that different professions, countries, institutions and even political parties employ the concept to achieve their 
own specific needs (Nwangwu, 2013).  Nevertheless, there appears a general level of agreement on what constitutes a 
PPP. For the purposes of this paper, a PPP may be defined as a long term relationship between public sector agencies 
and private sector entities under which the responsibility for any or all of the combination of designing, financing, 
construction, management and operation of public infrastructure and utilities that were traditionally undertaken by the 
public sector are contractually shared and jointly undertaken by both the public and private sector, usually in proportion 
to the kind of risks each party can best  carry (Nwangwu, 2013).   
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The Malaysian PPP Guidelines identifies some elements of PPPs: 
i. The relationship between the public and private sector parties is based on a partnership, which means that 
risk is shared between both partners optimally as it is allocated to the party who is best able to manage it. 
ii. The public sector procures specified outputs and outcomes of a service for the contract period whilst the 
private sector determines the required inputs to achieve the specified output and are given the freedom to 
introduce innovation into their design and development to reduce cost; There is thus an integration of 
design, construction, finance and maintenance and operation 
iii. Payment for services is based on predetermined standards and performances 
iv. PPP promotes a ‘maintenance culture’ where the private sector will be responsible for the long term 
maintenance of the assets throughout the operational period agreed upon by the parties; 
v. In some instances, there is an option for the transfer of the infrastructure asset back to the public sector at 
the end of the contract period. 
vi. PPP involves a Whole Life Cycle Costing (“WLCC”) whereby PPP projects are usually awarded based on 
lowest total cost over the contract period compared to lowest construction cost under traditional 
procurement (Putrajaya PPP Unit, 2009) 
3. Why Do Governments Use PPPs?  
The overwhelming motivation for governments around the world for the use of PPPs, appears to be the inadequacy of 
public funds to meet the increased demand for infrastructure (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Albert, Chan and Kajewski, 
2009). Therefore it is not surprising that most governments, including the Nigerian government, view PPPs as a costless 
means of financing infrastructure projects. The argument is usually that by getting the private sector to finance PPPs 
projects, the government is able to deploy scarce resources for other social purposes. This is erroneous as there are no 
costless PPP projects. PPPs at best merely suspend the payment for the infrastructure to a future date. Under the 
availability payment method of funding PPPs, the government still makes periodic payments for services rendered; 
while under the user fee payment schemes, payments made by the public may be viewed as indirect taxes that are 
collected from citizens as governments effectively delegate their rights to collect taxes from citizens to the private 
sector operators.  
It is also the case that even in situations where the government concedes that the PPP projects would involve the 
expenditure of public funds, the projects are still conceived as being extra budgetary in order to avoid any possible 
budget ceiling or restriction. Governments are mostly able to achieve this by structuring PPPs in a manner that presents 
the projects as being financed outside of the government balance sheet. This is possible due to the fact that most public 
sector accounting rules do not account for expenditure made by the private sector in delivering PPP projects as they are 
not usually considered part of the public debt. This is also regardless of whether the project is likely to generate 
considerable contingent liabilities. 
Another reason why PPPs are often considered to be more expensive than conventionally procured projects is that being 
long term contracts, they are susceptible to re-negotiations. Some of the re-negotiations may be permissible since they 
arise due to unforeseen changes in the economic, political or social fundamentals of the contract. This is not uncommon 
in PPP contracts, as the length of the term of PPP contracts distorts the bargain of the parties. However, some of the 
reasons for contractual re-negotiations may arise from the opportunistic behaviors of the private sector parties. For 
instance, some bidders for PPP projects deliberately bid opportunistically to win projects by whatever means and then 
come back to renegotiate projects after signing the contracts. This invariably makes the project more expensive than 
earlier envisaged and ensures that the benefits arising from the competitive nature of PPP procurements are lost.  
In the absence of the other benefits that accrue to PPP projects, they might end up being more expensive than publicly 
procured projects as it is usually cheaper for governments to borrow than the private sector. The reason for this is that 
the market considers it less risky to lend to sovereigns. It may well be the case that the reason why governments seem to 
borrow cheaper than the private sector is that lenders tend to look at the global risk of the country when they lend to 
government as opposed to evaluating the individual projects on their own merits. Therefore, it might well be that the 
high borrowing costs which PPPs face are because of better project evaluation by lenders.  
The requirements for sovereign guarantees, viability gap funding (VGF) and other incentive schemes offered by the 
government to the private sector might make PPPs more expensive than traditionally procured projects. When viewed 
critically, these risk mitigating instruments typically make projects cheaper for investors by de-risking the projects. 
However, this does not make the risks disappear; it merely transfers the risks back to the public sector party through 
explicit or contingent liabilities. In some instances, private sector parties have relied on overly optimistic revenue 
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assumptions, with dire consequences for the private sector. The further challenge for the government with this is that 
even where such projects progress with guarantees, government’s contingent liabilities increase and eventually 
crystalize with devastating consequences. Badly prepared projects are more rampant where guarantees are issued 
indiscriminately to private sector parties. This unwittingly transfers project risks back to the government and reduces 
the incentive for the private sector to carry out rigorous project analysis. It is essential that a project guarantee 
dependent culture is not allowed to take root where instead of proper project analysis, private sector depends on 
sovereign guarantees.  
4. Benefits Derived from PPPs 
Although the argument that PPPs are costless or cheaper than traditional procurement does not hold water, there are 
benefits inherent in the use of PPPs to procure infrastructure projects. These benefits in themselves are sufficient 
incentives for the use of PPPs. There are countries that realize this and have effectively utilized PPPs as an 
organizational or management tool. For instance, the Netherlands has adopted PPP-type structures primarily to promote 
an efficient procurement regime and reform its public sector (Harris, 2012). PPPs have also been utilised variously as a 
governance or management tool and as a development strategy 
The following are some of the benefits that may accrue from focusing on PPPs as a management tool: 
4.1 Risk 
One of the major advantages of PPPs over other procurement models is the transfer of risk from the public sector to the 
private sector (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). One of the essential roles of PPPs therefore is to achieve optimal risk 
allocation. This ensures that parties are able to contribute their skills and expertise to the projects focusing on the areas 
where they can comparatively manage the risks better and therefore cheaper. Under traditional procurement, the risk 
assumed by the public sector when it owns and operates an infrastructure asset is often unvalued. What PPP ensures 
through the involvement of the private sector is that risk is adequately and properly identified, priced and then 
transferred to the party that is best able to manage it. Under traditional public procurement, decisions on options to 
follow in procuring a particular project is based on a cost benefit analysis that does not consider alternative ways of 
procuring the project but assumes a particular commercial approach, which is often procurement by the public sector. 
Once the procurement approach is decided, the public sector sets in motion a competition between bidders where price 
and non-price factors are assessed to ensure that VFM is achieved. However, in PPPs, the test for VFM is two-pronged: 
first there is competition between bidders like under traditional procurement. Secondly, the choice of a particular 
arrangement is also tested to ensure that it is capable of delivering VFM to the government (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
It is assumed that risk transfer will create value for the project and lead to savings on whole life cycle costs. The essence 
of the “partnership” in PPPs is the fact that parties are able to share the risks and rewards so that the party best able to 
assume a particular risk shoulders it. It is therefore not wise to transfer all the risks to the private sector as that would 
greatly impair the profitability and consequently the feasibility of the project. This will lead to either the abandonment 
of the project by the private sector, or escalate the cost of the project thereby reducing its economic viability, as the 
private sector will cost every risk allotted to it and charge a premium for them.  
It is apposite to note however that not everyone agrees that risk transfer to the private sector always leads to positive 
outcomes. There are contrary views to the effect that risk management practices could be highly variable, intuitive, 
subjective and unsophisticated (Akintoye, 2001; Loosemore, 2007). One of the foremost criticism of the management of 
risks in PPP projects is that PPP contracts usually involve lengthy and complex contract tendering procedures with a 
large number of stakeholders participating in the process. It is therefore argued that the complex nature of PPP 
procurements actually increases public sector risk rather than reduces it, increases service costs for the public and 
represents a barrier to the entry of small companies, which is patently uncompetitive (Loosemore, 2007; Moore and 
Muller, 1989). Another argument is that in certain situations PPPs are not economically viable for the private sector 
without exorbitant risk-related service charges, which are saddled on the public (Moore and Muller, 1989). Also, due to 
the long-term nature of PPP contracts and the changing nature of risks over the term of the PPP contract, there are 
doubts that parties will be able to fully conceive all probable risks that will materialize during the life span of the project. 
Therefore, in order to compensate for these unknown risks, the private sector consortium demands high-risk premiums 
that are eventually transferred to the public in the form of high user fees or availability payments (Moore and Muller, 
1989). 
However despite these criticisms, there is superior literature and arguments as discussed above to the effect that it is 
more desirable and rewarding to properly manage risks in PPPs (Grimsey Lewis, 2005). Consequently, this is because 
there is a correlation between the proper transfer and management of risk and the improvement of value for money in 
projects. The reason for this is simply because when parties expressly assume risks in projects, they now become more 
conscious of these risks and are able to reduce either the probability of the risk occurring or the financial consequences 
Studies in Media and Communication                                                             Vol. 9, No. 1; 2021 
45 
 
if it does, or both (Grimsey Lewis, 2005).   Accordingly, it is important, that every PPP project strives towards the 
proper allocation of risk between the public and private sectors as this is one of the most important advantages that may 
be derived from PPPs. 
4.2 Value for Money 
One of the major reasons for adopting PPPs is the claim that PPPs provide better value for money (VFM) for the public 
sector than traditional procurement. However, it is not all PPP projects that create VFM. Therefore, in deciding whether 
to finance a project through PPPs rather than via traditional public sector procurement, the government will usually test 
whether the PPP alternative presents better VFM for the public sector party.  As noted above, proper risk allocation in 
a project usually contributes to the attainment of VFM. Cheung et al carried out a comparative study of Hong Kong, 
Australia and the United Kingdom and discovered that proper risk allocation was the greatest VFM enabler in all three 
jurisdictions (Cheung et al., 2009). They discovered that when risks are properly handled, the project is susceptible to 
fewer pitfalls and t this leads to the achievement of VFM (Cheung et al., 2009). In a similar vein, Bing Li et al whilst 
conducting a research on the factors that enhanced VFM in PPP projects found that the top three factors are efficient 
risk allocation, output-based specification and the long-term nature of contracts (Li B. et al.,2006; Anderson, 2000). 
VFM is not an easy term to define because of its political underpinnings. The way it is defined thus depends on the 
motives and interests of the party carrying out the definition. It may therefore change over time due to political, 
economic and social developments (Ismail, 2011; Akintoye, 2003).  The term “VFM” may either be used as an 
absolute or relative term.  As an absolute term, it can be taken to mean that the benefits of purchase to the purchaser 
exceed the costs, while as a relative term it means that one of the options for meeting the purchaser’s needs provides 
greater benefits relative to cost than the other (Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission, 2009). According to 
the UK HM Treasury Value for Money Guide, VFM is “the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or 
fitness for purpose) of the goods or service to meet the users requirements. VFM is not the choice of goods and services 
based on the lowest cost of the bid” (Treasury, 2006; Takim et al., 2011). In essence the UK HM Treasury’s definition 
underlines that in determining the value of pursuing a project as a PPP, the public sector must account for the cost 
savings to be made from the project over the lifetime of the project. In addition, it stresses that VFM assessment should 
ensure that the public agencies focus on the competency of the private sector, not only on securing the lowest bids 
(Treasury, 2006). 
According to Grimsey and Lewis, a number of conditions ought to be met in order to achieve VFM in projects: Firstly, 
projects should be awarded in a competitive environment. Secondly economic appraisal techniques, including proper 
appreciation of risk, should be vigorously applied, and risk allocated between the public and private sectors so that the 
expected value of money is maximized. Finally, the comparisons between publicly and privately financed options 
should be fair, realistic and comprehensive (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). VFM itself is a broad term that captures both 
financial and non-financial elements of evaluations (Takim et al., 2011). To ensure that the analysis of the two 
alternatives available to the government is comparable, there will be a need for a proper accounting for quality of 
services, price, timeframe, risk apportionment and certainty (Department of Treasury and Finance, 2011). VFM is often 
computed in most jurisdictions by using a benchmark called the Public Sector Comparator (“PSC”). The PSC simply 
describes the options and assesses what it would cost the public sector to provide the outputs it is requiring from the 
private sector on its own. Thus the private sector bids are assessed against the PSC to determine which of the two 
options will guarantee better VFM (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002) 
In essence, where PPPs are sold to the user public and delivered in a manner that ensures that they deliver VFM, it 
becomes a very attractive proposition. 
4.3 PPPs Lead to Greater Efficiency 
PPPs if done properly are most likely to lead to greater efficiency and merit in a government’s procurement of goods 
and services. PPPs are able to ensure that public funds are spent wisely on deserving projects and in sectors that create 
the greatest value. This is made possible because by its nature, PPPs promote full costing at an early stage in project 
development. A private sector investor would be unlikely to invest in a project that is not viable, unlike public sector 
procurements which may be pursued for other political considerations. All these ensure that “white elephant” projects or 
the proverbial “bridge that goes to nowhere” are avoided as only deserving projects are pursued. In addition, it provides 
a key management tool during the procurement process by focusing attention on the output specification, risk allocation 
and comprehensive costing, allowing for proper contract management during the operational phase of the project. Also, 
it provides a consistent benchmark and an evaluation tool for projects through the use of the PSC or similar 
methodology. Finally, PPPs encourage competition first between two different procurement options and then amongst 
bidders; these process help in generating confidence in the market that financial rigor and probity principles have 
applied to the project thereby making financing of the project easier (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
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4.4 Avoiding Cost Overruns 
PPPs ensure that projects are completed on time and that the risks of costs overrun and contract variations are 
significantly diminished (Anastasopoulos and Haddock, 2014). This is achieved by transferring construction risk, both 
in terms of cost and duration, to the private sector party. Construction risk is transferred to the private sector by 
bundling the entire PPP value chain under a Build Operate Transfer (BOT) for instance and making the private sector 
party responsible for their delivery.  Therefore, if the private sector party is unable to complete the build aspect on time 
or fails to do so within budget, it loses money. It is also the case that once the term of the contract starts to run, the 
period of the concession begins to shrink.  Therefore, due to the fact that the private sector investor is likely to lose out 
if the project is delayed, there is an added incentive to speed up the project and avoid anything that would increase the 
project cost unduly.  
This is particularly important in Nigeria where most projects suffer sever cost overruns due principally to the 
inefficiencies in implementing government budgets. There is hardly any major publicly procured project that has been 
delivered within time and within the stipulated timeframe. Therefore even though construction costs may appear higher 
under PPPs, the money saved from avoiding cost overruns will most likely cover whatever initial savings (Blanc-Brude, 
2006). 
4.5 Guaranteed Operations and Maintenance. 
By bundling the construction, operation and maintenance of the assets, PPPs ensure that assets are properly operated 
and continuously maintained by the private sector operators.  The payment of user fees usually also ensures that the 
user public demand better services as the public see a direct correlation between the money spent and the quality of 
services provided. This will solve the problem that is encountered in Nigeria where public infrastructure is usually 
poorly maintained thereby costing so much more to rehabilitate in the future. 
4.6 Fighting Corruption 
PPPs are essential to the fight against corruption. Public procurements in most developing countries are usually opaque. 
In Nigeria for instance, despite the enactment of the Procurement Act, 2007, it is an exception rather than the norm to 
witness a transparent public procurement process. The winners of bids are long decided before the projects even make 
their way into the budget or are advertised for expression of interests from prospective bidders. Also, under public 
procurement, where the management of the infrastructure assets are in the hands of public sector officials, the chain of 
corruption continues as further dubious contracts are awarded to operate and maintain the assets and when the assets are 
finally in near collapse due to the previous corrupt procurement processes, another dubious contract is awarded for a 
turnaround maintenance which is another term for retrofitting or replacement of the infrastructure. 
PPPs help fight corruption first of all because of the competitive and transparent procurement process that projects 
undergo before they are delivered. Secondly, PPPs by excluding public sector from the operation of the assets, deny 
public sector officials the opportunity to influence the award of contracts during the operational phase of the project. 
This, more than anything, saves the public enormous resources that would have otherwise ended up in private pockets.    
4.7 Political Considerations 
PPPs allow for the management of public infrastructure services in more politically attractive forms than nationalization 
or privatization (Savas, 2007). Citizens are usually suspicious and wary of their governments divesting public services 
to private sector. This is why there has been so much resistance against privatizations across the world (Uba, 2008). 
PPPs provide a good alternative as it does not lead to a complete divestiture of the public asset. Unlike under 
privatisation, ownership of the assets remains in the hands of the private sector and only operation is transferred to the 
private sector and even this reverts to the public sector at a future date. For this reason, it is easier for governments to 
sell PPPs as an economic policy than as outright privatisations.  
5. Conclusion 
Presently, PPPs are sold as the panacea for all of the many infrastructure challenges confronting Nigeria. This paper 
shows that this is not correct and that whilst PPPs have a number of advantages, they are incapable of solving the 
myriad of infrastructure challenges confronting the country. The paper advances the argument that one of the principal 
reasons for the low success rate of PPPs within Nigeria is because of the government focusing principally on PPPs as a 
financing tool with little attention to the immense potential PPPs have as a management tool. Also it needs to be 
realized that PPPs are not without flaws. For instance, it has been suggested that PPPs have tended to be more 
expensive than traditional procurement solutions due to the high cost of borrowing available to the private sector, 
exorbitant transaction fees, high administrative charges/fees for managing PPP transactions and over reliance on 
guarantees by private sector, thereby increasing government’s contingent liabilities significantly. Also PPPs are very 
complex arrangements requiring very expensive consultants to deliver (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007). These are the 
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problems that must be addressed by any PPP programme. 
The paper also shows that PPPs have advantages that far outweigh its disadvantages. It is only when these enormous 
advantages of PPPs are better appreciated and effectively communicated, that the tone is set for better project risk 
management and therefore the delivery of more sustainable projects. Consequently, it is advocated that the messaging 
about what PPPs are and what the government is able to achieve through them should change. The way PPPs are 
delivered should also reflect the fact that PPPs deliver more than just providing government with additional or 
alternative financing as they could also be an effective mm management tool.  
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